Release: 2014 / US Department of Defense

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This paper shows that there are multiple linkages between unpaid work and the conventional macroeconomy, and this makes it necessary to expand the boundary of conventional macroeconomics so as to incorporate unpaid work. The paper presents the two approaches: the valuation of unpaid work into satellite accounts, and the adoption of the triple “R” approach of recognition, reduction, and reorganization of unpaid work, recommended by experts. However, there is a need to go beyond these approaches to integrate unpaid work into macroeconomics and macroeconomic policies. Though some empirical work has been done in terms of integrating unpaid work into macro policies (for example, understanding the impacts of macroeconomic policy on paid and unpaid work), some sound theoretical work is needed on the dynamics of the linkages between paid and unpaid work, and how these dynamics change over time and space. The paper concludes that the time has come to recognize that unless unpaid work is included in macroeconomic analyses, they will remain partial and wrong. The time has also come to incorporate unpaid work into labor market analyses, and in the design of realistic labor and employment policies.

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This paper contrasts the different approaches to export-led growth used by Harrod and Thirlwall. It argues that, unlike Thirlwall's model, Harrod emphasized the importance of both demand- and supply-sides in his analysis of growth. The fundamental difference between the two authors lies in their differing characterizations of the long run. While both authors assume unemployment, Thirlwall's long run is presumably consistent with excess capacity, while Harrod's warranted path assumes normal capacity growth. Harrod's perspective suggests that if the warranted growth rate exceeds the natural growth rate, desired saving is excessive relative to the amount that is necessary to maintain the economy along its maximum growth path. Under these circumstances, rising exports have the beneficial effect of adjusting the warranted path to the economy's maximum growth path while, at the same time, giving a boost to the actual growth rate. If, however, the warranted growth rate is lower than the natural rate, then rising net exports have to be accompanied by appropriate fiscal and/or tax policies to raise warranted growth. In either case, the long-run growth rate is regulated by the social saving rate (other things equal). Data for a number of OECD countries tend to confirm this implication of what might be called a classical-Harrodian perspective. The Harrodian growth tradition suggests that growth in an open economy, with normal capacity utilization and persistent cycles, can be characterized as export-oriented rather than export-led since both demand- and supply-side factors are important.

Publications | Levy Economics Institute

This document presents a description of the quality of match of the statistical matches used in the LIMTCP estimates prepared for Ghana and Tanzania. For Ghana, the statistical match combines the Living Standards Survey Round 6 (GLSS6) with the Ghana Time Use Survey (GTUS) 2009, and for Tanzania it combines the Household Budget Survey (THBS) 2012 with the time-use data obtained from the Integrated Labor Survey Module (ILFS) 2006. In both cases, the alignment of the two datasets is examined, after which various aspects of the match quality are described. Despite the differences in the survey years, the quality of match is high and the synthetic dataset appropriate for the time poverty analysis.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - …

External Memory Interface Handbook Volume 2: Design Guidelines

Highlighting that France and Germany held largely contradicting hopes and aspirations for Europe’s common currency, this paper analyzes how the resulting euro contradiction conditioned the ongoing euro crisis as well as current strategies to resolve it. While Germany generally prevailed in hammering out the design of the euro policy regime, the German authorities have failed to see the inconsistency in their policy endeavors: the creation of a model whose workability presupposes that others behave differently cannot be made to work by forcing everyone to behave like Germany. This fundamental misunderstanding has made Germany the main culprit in the euro crisis, but it has yet to face the full consequences of its actions. Germany had sought every protection against the much-dreaded euro “transfer union,” but its own conduct has made that very outcome inevitable. Conversely, having been disappointed in its own hopes for the euro, France is now facing the prospect of a lost generation—a prospect, shared with other debtor nations in the union, that has undermined the Franco-German alliance and may soon turn it into the ultimate euro battleground.

Planning Pin and FPGA Resources

Research Associate Jörg Bibow investigates the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the (mal)functioning of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), focusing on the German intellectual and historical traditions behind the euro policy regime and its central bank guardian. His analysis contrasts Keynes’s chartalist conception of money and central banking with the postwar traditions nourished by the Bundesbank and based on a fear of fiscal dominance. Keynes viewed the central bank as an instrument of the state, controlling the financial system and wider economy but ultimately an integral part of, and controlled by, the state. By contrast, the “Maastricht (EMU) regime” (of German design) positions the central bank as controlling the state. Essentially, Bibow observes, the national success of the Bundesbank model in pre-EMU times has left Europe stuck with a policy regime that is wholly unsuitable for the area as a whole. But regime reform is complicated by severely unbalanced competitiveness positions and debt overhang legacies. Refocusing the ECB on growth and price stability would have to be a part of any solution, as would refocusing area-wide fiscal policy on growth and investment.